SECURITIES REGULATION: RULE lOb-5 PURCHASER/
SELLER REQUIREMENT SATISFIED EVEN WITHOUT
ACTUAL SALE IN SHORT-FORM MERGER SITUATION
TH Second Circuit, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.., has allowed

a civil liability action under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange
Act2 and rule lOb-53 even though the plaintiff had not actually sold
his stock. When Beneficial Finance, a major small-loan company,
became interested in acquiring Crown Finance, Beneficial arranged
with the officers and directors of Crown to buy at a premium their
Class B stock which held voting control. Beneficial then made a
public tender to Class A holders, whose stock had sizable dividend
and liquidation advantages. Having thereby acquired 95% of all
shares, Beneficial executed a short-form merger.4 This purchase
scheme resulted in an 800,000 dollar saving for Beneficial and a
900,000 dollar gain for the B shareholders, all at the expense of the
A holders. However, Vine, one of the A holders, refused the tender.
Thus, when he sued, the district court dismissed, reasoning that the
plaintiff had to qualify as a seller in order to bring a 1Ob-5 action.
In reversing, the Second Circuit attributed the requisite status to
Vine since the short-form merger gave him no alternative but sale.
Moreover, it held that a plaintiff's reliance on the fraud need not
be shown in the case of a forced sale. 6
Although sEction 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its
implementing rule lOb-5 broadly proscribe fraud "in connection with
the purchase or sale" of securities, the private actions subsequently
allowed under those provisions have been subject to some limitations. For example, the plaintiff must prove a causal connection
between the fraud and the harm which he suffered8 as well as some
1374

F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).

248 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964, Supp. 1966).
'374 F.2d at 630-31; See N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 905.
252 F. Supp. 212 (S.DN.Y. 1966).
67 374 F.2d at 634-35.
See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); cf.
notes 9-10, 13-24 infra and accompanying text.
8 See Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kremer v.
Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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degree of reliance upon the deceptive statements of his defendant.9
Moreover, while courts have abandoned any privity requirement' 0
and given an expansive interpretation to the "in connection with"
clause of section 10 (b), 11 a restrictive "buyer/seller" test, first enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,2 still remains. In that
action, the court reasoned that rule lOb-5 was promulgated only

to perfect the securities law which had not previously proscribed
fraudulent buying of securities and that, therefore, persons who were

neither sellers nor buyers were not to be included in the protected
class. 18
Although the Birnbaum test has yet to be rejected expressly, its
seemingly rigid classifications have been expanded to accommodate
varied transactions.

4
Hence, both the initial issuance of securities

and the exchange of stock for stock in a corporate merger' 5 have been
recognized as involving a purchase or sale under lOb-5. An underwriter's unexecuted agreement to distribute an issue'" and an in-

vestor's unfilled promise to purchase stock from a broker 17 have also
been deemed to satisfy the Birnbaum rule.

Likewise, one who se-

cures a stock purchase loan with a portion of the acquired shares is
given "buyer" status in an action against a collateral holder who
unlawfully disposes of the securities. 18
0 See Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-68 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). But see
note 27 infra and accompanying text. See generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 678-80 (1963).
10 Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3, 37-38 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Brown
v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); see New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F.
Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F.
Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 807 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1137
(1950).
Il See, e.g., Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); M. L. Lee & Co. v. American
Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
12 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
18
Id. at 463.
14
See, e.g., Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn.
1966).
15
See, e.g., Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 869 (D. Del.
1965); H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16 M. L. Lee 8- Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
"'A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1967), 1967 DuKE L.J. 894.
18 Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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Even the fraudulently induced deferral of sale followed at a later
date by sale at a loss has been determined to be fraud "in connection
with a sale" and thus actionable under lOb-5. 10 However, the Birnbaum test was given one of its most liberal applications in Voege V.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.20 where, on facts substantially
identical to Vine, the plaintiff had bought the stock twenty years
before the time of trial. When a public tender followed by a shortform merger threatened her with a forced sale, she brought suit under lOb-5. The court found that by Delaware corporate law she had
purchased under an implied contract to sell in case of a short-form
merger. Since a contract to sell is treated as a sale under the Securities Exchange Act,21 plaintiff was a seller. 22

Having thus isolated a

twenty-year-old contract to sell which could be coupled with the
recent fraud, the court then found the requisite reliance in "the
justifiable assumption [at the time of purchase] that any merger would
deal with her fairly .... 23 Whatever the merits of the Voege approach, the district court in Vine distinguished it by reasoning that
Vine, unlike Voege,, had not exhausted state remedies available to
24
stop the merger.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of Vine's complaint, the
Second Circuit noted the expansive construction the cases have given
the "sale" concept and accordingly held that Vine was a seller for
lOb-5 purposes since the short-form merger and consequent freezing
of his assets left him no alternative but sale.2 5 Moreover, even
though reliance may be necessary in some cases, the court regarded
it as "unnecessary . . . when no volitional act is required and the

result of a forced sale is exactly that intended by the wrongdoer." 2
Similarly, the court-refused to regard the possible existence of a state
remedy as relevant to the availability of a federal right. The SEC,
as amicus, had requested the court to go further and to determine
that in merger cases such as the instant one, a plaintiff-shareholder
may sue under rule 1Ob-5 irrespective of whether he relinquished his
11 Stockwell

v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
21 See 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (14) (1964).
22 241 F. Supp. at 374.
28
Id.at 375.
24252 F. Supp. 212, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
25 374 F.2d at 634.
20 241

2

5

Id. at 635.
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holding "so long as the Rule has been violated and plaintiff's stock
lost value as a result," but the court merely noted that the contention
27
was "interesting."
While the Second Circuit was able to fit Vine within the Birnbaum standard, a better approach would have been to disregard the
buyer/seller shibboleth and to decide the case expressly on the
language and policy of section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5. As the Birnbaum court observed, lOb-5 was added so that action could be taken
against fraudulent buyers as well as fraudulent sellers. However,
that interpretation does not necessarily require that only defrauded
buyers and sellers are allowed private remedies under lOb-5, especially since section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5 did not explicitly contemplate civil liability28 and thus could not have identified precisely
those deserving recovery. While the buyer/seller test may have some
merit in barring suits alleging no more than a breach of fiduciary
duties, 29 complex arguments straining to meet the literal language
of "buyer" or "seller," detract from a well-formulated overall rule
upon which courts and litigants can rely. Further, the Birnbaum
doctrine directs attention away from the allegations of fraudulent
sale or purchase and the causal connection to the plaintiff's loss and
instead concentrates on the status of the plaintiff. As an alternative,
rule lOb-5 civil liability could be predicated on an investor's loss
which is proximately caused by fraud or deceit in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.30 This standard would appear to
meet the statutory intent of protecting the investing public while still
restricting lOb-5 liability to cases directly tied to fraudulent securities
transactions.
27 Id. at 636.
28 See Ruder, supra note 9, at 642-60. cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 877 U.S. 426
(1964) (approval of civil liability under section 14 (a) Securities Exchange Act).
20 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 285, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (waste and
mismanagement claim not actionable under lOb-5). See generally Comment, 74 YALE
L.J. 658, 680-82 (1965).
3o See Comment, 74 YAm Lj. 658, 671-74 (1965).

